A Response to people who keep calling for diplomacy because they ignore the existing history of diplomacy which Putin has violated repeatedly:
Diplomatic Agreements Between Russia and Ukraine since 1990
Numerous people I used to have respect for keep calling for an immediate cease fire and diplomatic solutions to the Russian war on Ukraine. Medea Benjamin and Nicolas J S Davies are two of the top harmful writers with a reach. I used to just think Benjamin was naïve but now consider her dangerously, harmfully naïve. Noam Chomsky is another one I used to think well of. No more. Damn fools.
They seem to be very unaware of the long list of diplomatic agreements between Ukraine and Russia starting with the first separation from the old USSR/Russia in 1991 straight through to today, including Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s negotiations which started as he came into office.
Worse, they often wipe out any consideration of formal, signed on paper, with multiple nations, by bringing up an informal aside between Bill Clinton and a Russian diplomat in the early 1990s.
And they keep claiming that the United States and NATO are constitute a legitimate threat to Russia, ignoring that the numbers of nations joining the EU did so not because they were somehow pressured or bribed or induced by EU, NATO and the US, but because they wanted to get as far away from Russia as they could. They were overrun by the USSR in WWII which never let them be free, invading them with troops and tanks when they showed independence. With the breakup of the USSR into Russia and other former republics in the union, including themselves, they wanted out. They wanted the kind of economies they could see for themselves in Europe.
Back to the “you-must-negotiate” crowd.
1 – they clearly haven’t done their research. Even the list I have below doesn’t catch everything.
2 – they clearly don’t grasp that diplomacy is not a magic bullet. Diplomacy is only as good as the will of the leaders in charge, in this case Putin.
3 – they don’t begin to get that diplomacy to Putin is not an agreement to hold in place, diplomacy to Putin is an opportunity to lie in wait for the next invasion.
4 –diplomacy, when successful, is the last act, after everyone is ready for the agreement.
It is a pattern of kings, autocrats, dictators and any authoritarian, that diplomacy is mostly a way to hold off the potential opposition until they can find a new opening to attack. Similar to a boxer’s footwork before figuring out when and where to land the next punch, watching an opponent’s moves until the boxer is ready. This is how a street thug thinks. Putin is not a political leader. He is a street thug.
On the street a thug looks for an opening, then swoops in and strikes before their victim has a chance to process the attack and form a response. That is essential for a thug. They are not looking to fight rounds with a referee. They want to get away as soon as possible or they stand a good chance of being toast. Being any kind of predator, animal or human, is hazardous to the predator. If the victim is able to form a response the predator is liable to be injured. To understand Putin, you need to see him as a street thug, albeit one with an army, navy and air force to do the “work” and absorb any injury.
What the “Damn fools” don’t get is that their way of looking at the world is limited. They think of the world and diplomacy as if this were a play or screenplay in which the script and direction can be controlled to a predetermined ending. They tend to think of diplomacy as the enforcement mechanism. They have an investment in their theoretical constructs, rather than evaluating the personalities directing the action.
Repeating: Diplomacy, like a script, is only as good as the willingness of the actors (political and actual) to go along with what is written on the page. In the case of invasion, this is not some actor going a bit off script and adlibbing, this is a non-actor, picking up the script as camouflage to get on stage, then tearing up the script, shredding it, blowing up the stage and setting fire to the theater. In the meantime, the “Damn Fools” are still trying to perform the script as if nothing had changed.
Diplomacy, by itself, does not stop the killing. Worse, diplomacy as the magic solution, may well cause worse killing with the next resumption of attacks by the original attacker, especially because the attacker can build an extended list of what to destroy.
In this case diplomacy becomes just another tactic to form the next invasion.
You always must ask who benefits and in what way from diplomacy. Otherwise, realize that this is a fight for survival. Do not tell the people who are being attacked yet another time that they need to stop defending themselves. You are killing the people you claim to care about.
The “proxy war” is on the part of Russia, not the US and not NATO. Putin moved troops without insignia (called “little green men”) into Donbass and Crimea and claimed they were separatists. I don’t even want to hear the “proxy war” claim because that is a pure creation of Russian disinformation. I won’t go into it here, not enough time. The claim disgusts me because it is deployed as a way of smearing Ukraine and the Zelenskyys. Just a trigger word, unaccompanied by information.
I’ve included the full text of Putin’s 2021 July 12th article (in-article link) building a case for the next invasion of Ukraine, seven months later. It’s down to the bottom (link in this line). I created a simple dot graph using 100 typed periods to show how little of the article is devoted to NATO (about 1.5%, 88% of the way down the 6,901-word page). There is also a link to the original on the Kremlin’s web site.
Numerous writers have noted that Putin considered the end of the Soviet Union a great tragedy. Putin wants to put it back together, by any means.
I’ve also included a couple of selected articles from Quora. It is a user-contributed site, so it is always good practice to double check anything from Quora. Still, I thought they had something worth passing along which contributed to this article.
That’s it for now,
Mike Strong
MikeStrongPhotoVid@gmail.com
www.KCDance.com and www.MikeStrongPhoto.com
26 June 2023
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https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Singing_Revolution
1987-1991 – The Singing Revolution
was a series of events in 1987–1991 that led to the restoration of independence of the three then Soviet-occupied Baltic countries of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania at the end of the Cold War. The term was coined by an Estonian activist and artist, Heinz Valk, in an article published a week after the 10–11 June 1988 spontaneous mass evening singing demonstrations at the Tallinn Song Festival Grounds.
1990 – The Revolution on Granite
First major political protest in Ukraine against remaining part of the USSR.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ukrainian_Soviet_Socialist_Republic
1985-1991 – Gorbachev and dissolution
Following the failed August Coup in Moscow on 19–21 August 1991, the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine declared independence on 24 August 1991, which renamed the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic to Ukraine. The result of the 1991 independence referendum held on 1 December 1991 proved to be a surprise. An overwhelming majority, 92.3%, voted for independence. The referendum carried in the majority of all oblasts. Notably, the Crimea, which had originally been a territory of the RSFSR until 1954, supported the referendum by a 54 percent majority. Over 80 percent of the population of Eastern Ukraine voted for independence. Ukraine’s independence was almost immediately recognized by the international community. Ukraine’s new-found independence was the first time in the 20th century that Ukrainian independence had been attempted without either foreign intervention or civil war. In the 1991 Ukrainian presidential election 62 percent of Ukrainians voted for Leonid Kravchuk, who had been vested with presidential powers since the Supreme Soviet’s declaration of independence.[49] The secession of the second most powerful republic in the Soviet Union ended any realistic chance of the Soviet Union staying together even on a limited scale.
https://hls.harvard.edu/today/there-was-no-promise-not-to-enlarge-nato/
‘There was no promise not to enlarge NATO’
Robert Zoellick, the U.S. diplomat who helped negotiate the end of the Cold War, says Vladimir Putin’s claims about Ukraine are part of a disinformation campaign
Mar 16, 2022 By Jeff Neal
… former Under Secretary of State Robert Zoellick ’81 was in the room where it happened.
During the 1990 summit, Zoellick says President Gorbachev accepted the idea of German unification within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, based on the principle that every country should freely choose its own alliances.
“I was in those meetings, and Gorbachev has [also] said there was no promise not to enlarge NATO,” Zoellick recalls. Soviet Foreign Minister, Eduard Shevardnadze, later president of Georgia, concurred, he says. Nor does the treaty on Germany’s unification include a limit on NATO enlargement. …
Zoellick vividly recalls the White House meeting he attended nearly three decades ago in which Bush asked Gorbachev if he agreed with the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe principle that nations are free to ally with others as they see fit. When Gorbachev said yes, he says, the Soviet leader’s “own colleagues at the table visibly separated themselves.”
Sensing the import of the possible breakthrough, he says a colleague at the meeting, Robert Blackwill, sent him a note checking what they had heard and asking if they should ask Bush to repeat the question. “Gorbachev agreed again,” Zoellick recalls, to the principle that Germany could choose to enter NATO.
“The reality was that, in 1989-90, most people, and certainly the Soviets, weren’t focusing on whether the Eastern European countries would become part of NATO,” Zoellick says. Knowing Soviet and Russian diplomacy, he believes Moscow would have demanded assurances in writing if it believed the U.S. had made such a promise. And even in 1996, when President Bill Clinton welcomed former Warsaw Pact nations to join NATO, he says that, “[o]ne of the German diplomats involved told me that as they discussed the enlargement with the Russians, no Russian raised the argument that there had been a promise not to enlarge.”
… “Given Putin’s behavior, can you imagine what the effect would be on Poland today if it weren’t in NATO? I think it’s wise to have Poland and Germany on the same side. The Baltic countries were a tougher choice for NATO, not because they don’t deserve the security, but they’re very hard to defend.”
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2014/11/06/did-nato-promise-not-to-enlarge-gorbachev-says-no/
Did NATO Promise Not to Enlarge? Gorbachev Says “No”
Steven Pifer Thursday, November 6, 2014
… Western leaders never pledged not to enlarge NATO, a point that several analysts have demonstrated. Mark Kramer explored the question in detail in a 2009 article in The Washington Quarterly. He drew on declassified American, German and Soviet records to make his case and noted that, in discussions on German reunification in the two-plus-four format (the two Germanys plus the United States, Soviet Union, Britain and France), the Soviets never raised the question of NATO enlargement other than how it might apply in the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). …
https://www.csis.org/analysis/twq-myth-no-nato-enlargement-pledge-russia-spring-2009 – link Center for Strategic & International Studies
TWQ: The Myth of a No-NATO-Enlargement Pledge to Russia – Spring 2009
Journal by Mark Kramer, Published April 1, 2009
In the latter half of the 1990s, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was preparing to expand its membership for the first time since the admission of Spain in 1982, Russian officials claimed that the entry of former Warsaw Pact countries into NATO would violate a solemn ‘‘pledge’’ made by the governments of West Germany and the United States in 1990 not to bring any former Communist states into the alliance.1 Anatolii Adamishin, who was Soviet deputy foreign minister in 1990, claimed in 1997 that ‘‘we were told during the German reunification process that NATO would not expand.’’ Other former Soviet officials, including Mikhail Gorbachev, made similar assertions in 1996—1997. Some Western analysts and former officials, including Jack F. Matlock, who was the U.S. ambassador to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1990, endorsed this view, arguing that Gorbachev received a ‘‘clear commitment that if Germany united, and stayed in NATO, the borders of NATO would not move eastward.’’ Pointing to comments recorded by the journalists Michael Beschloss and Strobe Talbott, former U.S. defense secretary Robert McNamara averred that ‘‘the United States pledged never to expand NATO eastward if Moscow would agree to the unification of Germany.’’ According to this view, ‘‘the Clinton administration reneged on that commitment . . . when it decided to expand NATO to Eastern Europe.’’
These assertions were sharply challenged at the time by other observers, including former U.S. policymakers who played a direct role in the German reunification process. George H. W. Bush, Brent Scowcroft, and James A. Baker, who served as president, national security adviser, and secretary of state in 1990 respectively, all firmly denied that the topic of extending NATO membership to former Warsaw Pact countries (other than East Germany) even came up during the negotiations with Moscow on German reunification, much less that the United States made a ‘‘pledge’’ not to pursue it. In 1997, Philip Zelikow, who in 1990 was a senior official on the National Security Council (NSC) staff responsible for German reunification issues, maintained that the United States made no commitment at all about the future shape of NATO, apart from some specific points about eastern Germany that were codified in the Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany signed in September 1990. ‘‘The option of adding new members to NATO,’’ Zelikow wrote, was ‘‘not foreclosed by the deal actually made in 1990.’’ …
… Much of the controversy about this issue stems from a few conversations held in the first half of February 1990, just after the collapse of Communist regimes in Eastern Europe.
…
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1991_Ukrainian_independence_referendum
1991 Dec 1 – Ukrainian independence referendum
A referendum on the Act of Declaration of Independence was held in Ukraine on 1 December 1991.[1] An overwhelming majority of 92.3% of voters approved the declaration of independence made by the Verkhovna Rada on 24 August 1991.
Voters were asked “Do you support the Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine?”[2] The text of the Declaration was included as a preamble to the question. The referendum was called by the Parliament of Ukraine to confirm the Act of Independence, which was adopted by the Parliament on 24 August 1991.[3] Citizens of Ukraine expressed overwhelming support for independence. In the referendum, 31,891,742 registered voters (or 84.18% of the electorate) took part, and among them 28,804,071 (or 92.3%) voted “Yes”.[2]
On the same day, a presidential election took place. In the month up to the presidential election, all six candidates campaigned across Ukraine in favour of independence from the Soviet Union, and a “Yes” vote in the referendum. Leonid Kravchuk, the parliament chairman and de facto head of state, was elected to serve as the first President of Ukraine.[4]
From 2 December 1991 onwards, Ukraine was globally recognized by other countries as an independent state.[5][6][7] Also on 2 December, the President of the Russian SFSR Boris Yeltsin recognized Ukraine as independent.[8][9][10][11] In a telegram of congratulations Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev sent to Kravchuk soon after the referendum, Gorbachev included his hopes for close Ukrainian cooperation and understanding in “the formation of a union of sovereign states”.
1990 November 19 Treaty between Ukrainian SSR and RSFSR
1991 Dec 8 – Belovezha Accords
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Belovezha_Accords
Signed by:
- Belarusian Parliament Chairman Stanislav Shushkevich and Prime Minister of Belarus Vyacheslav Kebich
- Russian President Boris Yeltsin and First Deputy Prime Minister of the RSFSR/Russian Federation Gennady Burbulis
- Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk and Ukrainian Prime Minister Vitold Fokin
The main obligations of the parties to the Agreement, ratified by all former Soviet republics except Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, includes the following:
- The end of the existence of the USSR, with the “setting up of lawfully constituted democratic… independent states… on the basis of mutual recognition of and respect for State sovereignty”.[4]
- Establishing on the territory the “right to self-determination” along with “norms relating to human and people’s rights”.[4]
- “Parties guarantee to their citizens, regardless of their nationality or other differences, equal rights and freedoms. Each of the Parties guarantees to the citizens of the other Parties, and also to stateless persons resident in their territory, regardless of national affiliation or other differences, civil, political, social, economic and cultural rights and freedoms in accordance with the universal recognized international norms relating to human rights” (Article 2).[4]
- “The Parties, desirous of facilitating the expression, preservation and development of the distinctive ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious characteristics of the national minorities resident in their territories and of the unique ethno-cultural regions that have come into being, will extend protection to them” (Article 3).[4]
- “Equitable cooperation” (Article 4).[4]
- “Territorial integrity” along with “freedom of movement of citizens” (Article 5).
https://www.armscontrol.org/node/3289
1992 May 23 – The Lisbon Protocol At a Glance
A pervasive fear surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union was the uncertain fate of its nuclear arsenal. In addition to Russia, the emerging states of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine inherited a significant number of nuclear weapons, raising concerns that the Soviet Union would leave four nuclear weapon successor states instead of just one. Aside from increasing the number of governments with their finger on the proverbial nuclear button, the circumstances simultaneously raised concerns that those weapons might be more vulnerable to possible sale or theft. The Lisbon Protocol, concluded on May 23, 1992, sought to alleviate those fears by committing the three non-Russian former Soviet states to return their nuclear weapons to Russia. In spite of a series of political disputes that sparked some concerns about implementation of the protocol, all Soviet nuclear weapons were eventually transferred to Russia by the end of 1996.
https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/27389.pdf – link to the PDF of the Lisbon Protocol
The United States and Russia reached a solution to this complex problem by engaging Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in a series of talks that led to the Lisbon Protocol. That agreement made all five states party to the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which required Washington and Moscow to each cut their deployed strategic nuclear forces from approximately 10,000 warheads apiece to down below 6,000 warheads on no more than 1,600 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and long-range bombers. The protocol signaled the intentions of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine to forswear nuclear arms and accede to the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear-weapon states, a commitment that all three fulfilled and continue to abide by today.
Estimated Warheads in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine in 1991
Strategic Warheads | Tactical Warheads | |
Belarus | 100 | 725 |
Kazakhstan | 1,410 | Uncertain |
Ukraine | 1,900 | 2,275 |
1992 June 23 at Dagomys
Agreement between Ukraine and the Russian Federation on the Further development of inter-state relations
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Budapest_Memorandum –
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%203007/Part/volume-3007-I-52241.pdf Text of the Budapest Memorandum
1994 December 5 (effective) Budapest Memorandum
Memorandum on security assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
Budapest, 5 December 1994
Entry into force: 5 December 1994 by signature
Authentic texts: English, Russian and Ukrainian
Registration with the Secretariat of the United Nations: Ukraine, 2 October 2014
The Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances comprises three substantially identical political agreements signed at the OSCE conference in Budapest, Hungary, on 5 December 1994, to provide security assurances by its signatories relating to the accession of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The three memoranda were originally signed by three nuclear powers: the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States. China and France gave somewhat weaker individual assurances in separate documents.
The memoranda, signed in Patria Hall at the Budapest Convention Center with US Ambassador Donald M. Blinken amongst others in attendance, prohibited the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States from threatening or using military force or economic coercion against Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, “except in self-defence or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.” As a result of other agreements and the memorandum, between 1993 and 1996, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine gave up their nuclear weapons
According to the three memoranda, Russia, the US and the UK confirmed their recognition of Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine becoming parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and effectively abandoning their nuclear arsenal to Russia, and that they agreed to the following:
- Respect the signatory’s independence and sovereignty in the existing borders.
- Refrain from the threat or the use of force against the signatory.
- Refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by the signatory of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.
- Seek immediate Security Council action to provide assistance to the signatory if they “should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used”.
- Refrain from the use of nuclear arms against the signatory.
- Consult with one another if questions arise regarding those commitments.
History
Until Ukraine gave up the Soviet nuclear weapons stationed on its soil, it had the world’s third-largest nuclear weapons stockpile, of which Ukraine had physical but no operational control. Russia controlled the codes needed to operate the nuclear weapons through electronic Permissive Action Links and the Russian command and control system, although this could not be sufficient guarantee against Ukrainian access.
https://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Ukraine._Memorandum_on_Security_Assurances – HTML text of the Budapest Memorandum
Ukraine. Memorandum on Security Assurances
Memorandum on Security Assurances in connection with Ukraine’s accession to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
Budapest, 5 December 1994
Ukraine, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America,
Welcoming the Accession of Ukraine to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons as a non-nuclear-weapon state,
Taking into account the commitment of Ukraine to eliminate all nuclear weapons from its territory within a specified period of time,
Noting the changes in the world-wide security situation, including the end of the Cold War, which have brought about conditions for deep reductions in nuclear forces,
Confirm the following:
- The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and The United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.
- The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and The United States of America reaffirm their obligation to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine, and that none of their weapons will ever be used against Ukraine except in self-defense or otherwise in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.
- The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and The United States of America reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the Principles of the CSCE Final Act, to refrain from economic coercion designed to subordinate to their own interest the exercise by Ukraine of the rights inherent in its sovereignty and thus to secure advantages of any kind.
- The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and The United States of America reaffirm their commitment to seek immediate United Nations Security Council action to provide assistance to Ukraine, as a non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, if Ukraine should become a victim of an act of aggression or an object of a threat of aggression in which nuclear weapons are used.
- The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and The United States of America reaffirm, in the case of Ukraine, their commitment not to use nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, except in the case of an attack on themselves, their territories or dependent territories, their armed forces, or their allies, by such a state in association or alliance with a nuclear weapon state.
- Ukraine, The Russian Federation, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and The United States of America will consult in the event a situation arises which raises a question concerning these commitments.
This Memorandum will become applicable upon signature.
Signed in four copies having equal validity in the Ukrainian, English, and Russian languages.
FOR UKRAINE:
(signature Leonid Kuchma)
FOR THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION:
(signature Boris Yeltsin)
FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND:
(signature John Major)
FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
(signature Bill Clinton)
Budapest, 5 December 1994.
1996 – Ukraine enacts their Constitution and creates their currency (hryvnia)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian%E2%80%93Ukrainian_Friendship_Treaty
1997 May 31 (signed) 2000 April 1 (effective) 2019 March 31 (expired)
Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation, and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation
was an agreement between Ukraine and Russia, signed in 1997, which fixed the principle of strategic partnership, the recognition of the inviolability of existing borders, and respect for territorial integrity and mutual commitment not to use its territory to harm the security of each other. The treaty prevents Ukraine and Russia from invading one another’s country respectively, and declaring war.[2] Due to the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian War in 2014, Ukraine announced its intention not to renew the treaty in September 2018.[3] The treaty consequently expired on 31 March 2019.[4][3] The treaty was also known as the “Big Treaty”.[5][6]
Until 2019, the treaty was automatically renewed on each 10th anniversary of its signing, unless one party advised the other of its intention to end the treaty six months prior to the date of the renewal.[1][7]
Russia–Ukraine relations have deteriorated since the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea and Russian support for separatist forces in the war in Ukraine’s Donbas region.[8] In response, Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko signed a decree not to extend the treaty.
Signing and ratification[edit]
The treaty was signed in Kyiv on 31 May 1997 by the President of UkraineLeonid Kuchma and Russian PresidentBoris Yeltsin.[1]
In Ukraine, the treaty was ratified by the Law of Ukraine No. 13/98-VR on 14 January 1998 (On ratification of the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership between Ukraine and the Russian Federation).[9]
In Russia, on 25 December 1998, the State Duma of the Federal Assembly adopted a resolution on the adoption of the federal law “On ratification of the Agreement of Friendship, Collaboration and Partnership between the Russian Federation and Ukraine” and directed it to the Federation Council. The Federation Council approved this federal law by the Resolution on 17 February 1999. The treaty was ratified.[10]
The document superseded the previous treaty between the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic of 19 November 1990 (before dissolution of the Soviet Union).
2003 December 24 (signed) 2004 April 23 (effective)
Treaty Between the Russian Federation and Ukraine on Cooperation in the Use of the Sea of Azov and the Kerch Strait
is an agreement on sea and fisheries between Russia and Ukraine entered into force on 23 April 2004.[1][2] It was signed on 24 December 2003 by President of UkraineLeonid Kuchma and President of RussiaVladimir Putin[2] and ratified by both parliaments in April 2004.
2004 – 2005 : Orange Revolution
Huge protests by Ukrainians against corruption and election fraud
2013 – 2014 : Revolution of Dignity
Ukrainians protest corruption demanding that Ukraine join the EU. Viktor Yanukovych refuses, is deposed and self-exiles to Russia
2014 February-March – Crimea Annexed by Russia
2014 April – Donbas invaded by Russia
“Astro-turf” separatists – troops with identifiers
2014 & 2015 Minsk Agreements
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/9/what-is-the-minsk-agreement-and-why-is-it-relevant-now
What are the Minsk agreements?
Minsk I – 2014 September
Ukraine and the Russia-backed separatists agreed on a 12-point ceasefire deal in September 2014.
Its provisions included prisoner exchanges, deliveries of humanitarian aid and the withdrawal of heavy weapons. However, the agreement quickly broke down, with violations by both sides.
Minsk II – 2015 February
Representatives of Russia, Ukraine, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the leaders of separatist-held regions Donetsk and Luhansk signed a 13-point agreement in February 2015.
The leaders of France, Germany, Russia and Ukraine gathered in Minsk to mark the occasion and issued a declaration of support.
The deal’s 13 points were:
- Immediate, comprehensive ceasefire.
- Withdrawal of heavy weapons by both sides.
- OSCE monitoring.
- Dialogue on interim self-government for Donetsk and Luhansk, in accordance with Ukrainian law, and acknowledgement of special status by parliament.
- Pardon, amnesty for fighters.
- Exchange of hostages, prisoners.
- Humanitarian assistance.
- Resumption of socioeconomic ties, including pensions.
- Ukraine to restore control of state border.
- Withdrawal of foreign armed formations, military equipment, mercenaries.
- Constitutional reform in Ukraine including decentralisation, with specific mention of Donetsk and Luhansk.
- Elections in Donetsk and Luhansk.
- Intensify Trilateral Contact Group’s work including representatives of Russia, Ukraine and OSCE.
Why has the 2015 agreement failed to end fighting in eastern Ukraine?
The Minsk II deal set out military and political steps that remain unimplemented.
A major blockage has been Russia’s insistence that it is not a party to the conflict and therefore is not bound by its terms.
In general, Moscow and Kyiv interpret the pact very differently, leading to what has been dubbed by some observers as the “Minsk conundrum”.
What is the ‘Minsk conundrum’?
Ukraine sees the 2015 agreement as an instrument to re-establish control over the rebel territories.
It wants a ceasefire, control of the Russia-Ukraine border, elections in the Donbas, and a limited devolution of power to the separatists – in that order.
Russia views the deal as obliging Ukraine to grant rebel authorities in Donbas comprehensive autonomy and representation in the central government, effectively giving Moscow the power to veto Kyiv’s foreign policy choices.
Normandy Format Meetings
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Normandy_Format
The Normandy Format, also known as the Normandy contact group, is a grouping of states who met in an effort to resolve the war in Donbas and the wider Russo-Ukrainian War. The four countries who make up the group—Germany, Russia, Ukraine, and France—first met informally in 2014 during the 70th anniversary of D-Day celebrations in Normandy, France.
Creation and composition
The group was created on 6 June 2014, when leaders from France, Germany, Russia, and Ukraine met on the margins of the 70th anniversary of the D-Day allied landings in Normandy. It operates mainly through telephone calls between the leaders and their respective ministers of foreign affairs. The Normandy Format has at times been expanded to include Belarus, Italy, and the United Kingdom.
2014
Early talks in 2014 led to the establishment of the Trilateral Contact Group in order to facilitate further talks between Russia and Ukraine. This, along with mediation through the Normandy Format, directly led to the establishment of Minsk Protocol. This agreement, signed in September 2014, outlined several provisions for peace in the Donbas Region and Crimea.
2015
Following a continued break-down of relations in early 2015, the Normandy Format met during talks in Belarus from 11 to 12 February 2015. This was precipitated by a joint French-Germany diplomatic plan, which was negotiated overnight for over sixteen hours while the group met in Minsk. The emerging package, Minsk II, negotiated ceasefires as well as planned domestic reforms in Ukraine.
Negotiations and talks were stalled from 2016 until autumn 2019.
2019 – Zelensky is elected
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, in his May 2019 inaugural address made peace talks with Russia his top priority. He reaffirmed that priority in July that year when he invited via YouTube the other nations to a dialogue. He said: “Let’s discuss who Crimea belongs to and who isn’t in the Donbas region.”
On 18 July 2019, a “comprehensive” cease-fire was agreed with arbitration by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine.
In early September 2019, French President Emmanuel Macron and Russian President Vladimir Putin stated their intention to hold a Normandy format meeting. On 21 September, “continuing bickering” was cited as causing “a political tug-of-war” over the preliminaries to negotiations, as they had been since the Normandy Format meeting in 2016 in Berlin. Also in late September, a phone call between US President Donald Trump and Zelenskyy in which the latter described the support of France and Germany as lukewarm damaged Zelenskyy’s image in Europe. On 10 October, Zelenskyy repeated his statement in a public news conference. On 16 October, French and German leaders decided in favor of another Normandy Format meeting.
December 2019
Zelenskyy, after becoming president, tried to settle the war and “negotiate like a human being“, but Putin wanted to impose “Minsk“, which would be a great victory for the Russian Federation.
At the meeting in 2019, Putin counted on the “capitulation of Ukraine” and the unpreparedness of the Zelenskyy team. However, the President of Ukraine, during Putin’s speech “on special status“, almost laughed and covered his mouth with his hand.
https://www.cnbc.com/2019/12/10/russia-and-ukraine-agree-to-ceasefire-by-the-end-of-2019.html
CNBC, EUROPE POLITICS
Russia and Ukraine make small steps toward peace, but no big leap
PUBLISHED TUE, DEC 10 2019, 5:19 AM ESTUPDATED TUE, DEC 10 20196:53 AM EST, Holly Ellyatt
KEY POINTS
- Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a “full and comprehensive implementation” of a cease-fire before the end of 2019, after peace talks in Paris on Monday.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met in person for the first time on Monday.
- The meeting was a bid to resolve a more than five-year conflict in eastern Ukraine between pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian forces in which over 13,000 people have died.
Russia and Ukraine have agreed to a “full and comprehensive implementation” of a cease-fire in the Donbass region of Ukraine before the end of 2019, after peace talks in Paris on Monday, but how promises translate into action remains to be seen.
Russian President Vladimir Putin and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky met in person for the first time on Monday in a bid to resolve a long-running conflict in eastern Ukraine between pro-Russian separatists and Ukrainian forces.
Both leaders cautiously welcomed their meeting and Putin said that the process was “going in the right direction” but differences remain, including over the control of the Ukrainian-Russian border.
The conflict is one of the worst seen in modern Europe yet it is also largely seen as a “forgotten” war, having rumbled on for more than five years. In that time over 13,000 people have died, according to the United Nations, and hostilities have affected 3.9 million civilians living in the region.
Putin and Zelensky held a bilateral meeting as well as joint meetings with French President Emmanuel Macron and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, who have previously tried to broker a peace deal between the divided neighbors.
The group has become known as the “Normandy Four” and Monday was the first time it had met since October 2016.
2020 July 22 – Ceasefire
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-ceasefire-idUSKCN24N2SX
JULY 22, 2020, 3:11 PM
Deal reached for east Ukraine ceasefire from July 27
By Reuters Staff
KYIV (Reuters) – Ukrainian, Russian and OSCE negotiators reached an agreement on Wednesday for a full ceasefire between government forces and pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine from Monday, Ukraine’s president’s office said.
…
Zelenskiy has sought to resolve the conflict since his election last year, arranging a number of prisoner swaps. Ukraine and Russia have been foes since 2014, when Moscow seized Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula and backed the rebellion in the east.
2021 – April
Russia mobilizes troops along Ukraine’s borders, 150,000 to 200,000 troops East, South and North of Ukraine (including Belarus)
2021 July 12th
Putin’s article in which he builds a case to invade Ukraine 7 months before he does so, even while “negotiating” with Zelensky
FULL TEXT is below under “Related Topics” – Here I am just posting the link to the Kremlin’s own site (in English) and my own dot graph showing the relative position and size (%) of any mention about NATO.
Presidential Executive Office 2023
Source URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181
Length (headline and text): 6,901 words – 42,899 characters
Length of paragraph with “NATO” statement: 94 words – 635 characters
Distance down the document: starts after 6,047 words – 37,744 characters
94/6,901 = 0.01362 == 1.37%
635/42899 = 0.01480 == 1.5% call it 1.435%
6047/6901 = 0.8762 == starts 87.6% of the way down the page
37744/42899 = 0.8798 == starts 88% of the way down the page
……….……….……….……….……….……….……….……(.).……….
Article starts here – > 100 dots, the 88th (.) mentions NATO twice.
Clearly the importance of NATO in Putin’s stated concerns is very small. He waits until near the end of a long article and only then does he say anything about NATO, twice in one short paragraph (about 1.4% of the total size: 6,901 words / 42,899 characters).
2021 December 22
https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/osce-says-ceasefire-agreement-reached-eastern-ukraine-2021-12-22/
OSCE says ceasefire agreement reached for eastern Ukraine
Reuters, December 22, 2021, 3:04 PM CST
KYIV, Dec 22 (Reuters) – Negotiators from Ukraine, Russia and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) agreed to restore a full ceasefire between the Ukrainian government forces and Russia-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine, the OSCE said on Wednesday.
“I was delighted that participants expressed their strong determination to fully adhere to the Measures to Strengthen the Ceasefire agreement of 22 July 2020,” the Special Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office in Ukraine and in the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG), Ambassador Mikko Kinnunen said in a statement.
Kyiv and Moscow have blamed each other in recent months for violation of a previous ceasefire, which had been agreed in July 2020 and helped significantly reduce the number of casualties last year.
“This (new agreement) is of utmost significance for the people living on both sides of the contact line,” Kinnunen said.
He said that according to the special monitoring mission reports the security situation along the contact line remained volatile, with about five times more ceasefire violations on average per day recorded in December 2021 compared with December 2020.
Major combat between Ukrainian troops and Russian-backed forces ended with an agreement reached in the Belarus capital Minsk in 2015 with the mediation of Germany and France, but sporadic clashes still regularly kill civilians and soldiers in a military conflict which has lasted since 2014.
2022 January 26th, Paris – Negotiating as a setup for invasion one month later
A Normandy Format meeting between the four countries’ representatives was held in Paris on 26 January 2022 in the context of the lead-up to the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia, to be followed by a telephone conversation between the French and Russian presidents on 28 January. The representatives of the four governments confirmed their support for Minsk II and committed themselves to resolving existing disagreements. They supported an unconditional ceasefire, and supported strengthening of the 22 July 2020 ceasefire, independent of their disagreements about implementing other components of Minsk II. A follow up meeting was planned to take place in Berlin a fortnight later. No joint declaration was agreed upon at the conclusion of the nine-hour-long Normandy Format meeting held on 10 February, but the representatives planned to meet again in March. This meeting never occurred following the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Zelenskyy later announced that the Normandy Format was “destroyed” due to Russia’s actions. France and Germany continue to be involved in peace-talks between the two countries, while also providing support to Ukraine while denouncing Russia.
2023 June 24 – Denmark
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/18648
Denmark on Saturday hosts a meeting organized by Ukraine bringing together several nations — including those who have remained neutral on the Russian invasion — to discuss a path towards peace.
Few details have leaked about the meeting. However, a Western official speaking on condition of anonymity said that White House national security adviser Jake Sullivan would attend.
The meeting in Copenhagen aims to discuss ways of achieving a “just and lasting peace” in Ukraine, the source said.
The invitees include top security officials from the United States, the European Union and other countries that have backed Ukraine since Russia invaded last year, as well as those that have not condemned the invasion, the source added.
They did not specify which countries.
“We have worked very hard inside (the) G7 on a peace formula,” said a European diplomatic source, also speaking on condition of anonymity.
“So the idea is to go beyond that and involve key actors like Brazil and India. We frankly expect and wish that China will be there.”
The meeting was first reported by the UK’s Financial Times.
It cited sources familiar with the plans as saying the meeting could include officials from Brazil, India and South Africa, although the list of attendees had not been finalized.
…
But they are seen as a milestone on the path to a peace summit organized by Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky.
A date has not yet been set for this summit, which could be held in Copenhagen or Paris in the coming months, but the EU has said “substantial” preparation was necessary.
Related Topics
https://www.reuters.com/article/nato-ukraine/ukraines-new-president-seeks-pro-western-course-peace-with-russia-idINKCN1T522R
Reuters WORLD NEWS, JUNE 4, 2019, 10:30 AM
Ukraine’s new president seeks pro-Western course, peace with Russia
By Robin Emmott
BRUSSELS (Reuters) – New Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said on Tuesday he was ready to negotiate with Russia to end the war in eastern Ukraine while sticking to Ukraine’s goal of one day joining the European Union and the NATO alliance.
Speaking at NATO headquarters, Zelenskiy, a former comic actor with no prior political experience who took over as president on May 20, said he would keep Ukraine “on the path of European and Euro Atlantic integration”.
“The strategic course of Ukraine to achieve fully-fledged membership in the EU and NATO … remains unchanged,” Zelenskiy told reporters alongside NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg. “This is the priority of our foreign policy.”
Zelenskiy met European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker earlier on Tuesday in Brussels.
Zelenskiy has taken over a country on the frontline of the West’s standoff with Russia following Moscow’s 2014 annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea peninsula and a Kremlin-backed separatist conflict that has killed 13,000 people in eastern Ukraine.
NATO has provided training to Ukraine’s military and pledged to continue that support. Zelenskiy described Russian military power as a “major challenge” but said he was eager to revive a peace agreement reached in Minsk, Belarus.
https://www.kyivpost.com/post/18662
Garry Kasparov -The Fall of Putin is Inevitable
The initial reaction to the military revolt in Russia from a leading Russian democratic figure.
by Jason Jay Smart | June 24, 2023, 4:24 pm
Garry Kasparov, one of the foremost leaders of the Russian democratic opposition and human rights defenders, in an exclusive interview with Kyiv Post, analyzes what Prigozhin’s war against Putin means, how it will play-out, and what we should expect next.
Kasparov tells Kyiv Post:
“Putin was right by invoking 1917 [in his TV address on June 24]. This is clearly a 1917 situation. The war is not over but it did not go well. You have had hundreds of thousands of [Russian men] recruited, without a clear understanding of what they are doing – why are they are paying such a high price – why they have been taken away from their families.”
This coupled with the fact that, “Russia is a country with a huge social disparity. The ratio of poor to wealthy is worse than many African countries…These people have always lived under oppression,” something that is not even “about democracy,” rather “it is about them being subordinated even to the local police chief. Anyone with some power can push them around.”
Unfortunately for Putin, “Now – these people – have guns,” and “they have a charismatic leader. Ironically, Putin empowered him to bring criminals into the Army. And [Prigozhin] created a powerful army.”
This army of Wagnerites, today, says Kasparov “are seasoned warriors. Those who fought in Bakhmut have different ideas about life and death.”
“Prigozhin showed that the entire Putin Regime is just a Hollywood decoration: Where is [Chairman of the Russian Senate] Matvienko? Where is [Prime Minister] Mustian? Where are all the Ministers? Prigozhin has demonstrated that the whole system is rotten. It is a vacuum of power. You just need one push to demonstrate that.”
But will Putin fall?
“Most likely Putin is finished. The issue is that Prigozhin cannot create a government. It is a raw rebellion, and he does not have a political wing. That is the difference with 1917: Lenin had a political organization. Prigozhin does not,” which contributes to why “Russia is moving into chaos territory.”
Putin erred by “having an imperialist war without a clear message to the Russian public as to why they had to do it. Putin himself changed the reason so many times.” Now we see “the transformation – like Lenin: Transformation from imperialist war into civil war: As if he followed Lenin’s formula!”
The difference today, however, is that “unlike in 1917, [people in Russia] know about the decadence of the Russian elite. Russian peasants in 1917, in Tomsk or Penza, had very vague ideas about luxury. They knew it was different. But today they know. They watch Navalny’s movies, and right now they can do something about it. They can restore justice – or end injustice that they have suffered.”
But is it really possible to overthrow Putin?
“Now you have hundreds of thousands of armed people. Who must make a choice: Stay with Putin or join the rebellion. But why stay with the regime?”
Kasparov recalls that, “Yesterday, when the [Russian Army] generals showed up to condemn Prigozhin – I spoke to my friends, ‘Look it is not about generals. Of course, generals will condemn Prigozhin as they are beneficiaries of Putin’s mafia system.’ Rather, it is what the [normal guys] will do. And we got an answer this morning: They are changing sides.”
However, if the average Russian looks out his window and sees tanks and explosions – is it not warranted that they are afraid?
The average Russian “should be afraid. But there is nothing they can do. If you’re an average Russian citizen, you are stuck with a regime that is collapsing. It is like a dinosaur, this regime; it is a huge mass with little brains. When a dinosaur dies, it falls over and anything standing next to it will be crushed.”
Is Prigozhin a “good guy?”
“Prigozhin is a charismatic criminal. Is he worse than Putin? No, they are the same. But the Putin regime brought us to this disastrous state. The only way to the future is to see what will happen when this regime collapses.”
So, what should Prigozhin do?
“Prigozhin’s rebellion was forced by Shoigu. Shoigu wanted to beat Prigozhin by bureaucratic means. [Shoigu insisted] that all private military groups had to be brought under subordination [under Shoigu] by July 1. Which means Prigozhin would be at Shoigu’s mercy, and he would end up in Bakhmut, or elsewhere on the front line, by July 2. Rather than accept this fate, Prigozhin decided to fight back.”
Insisting that, “It is not about the opinion of generals. During a time of uncertainty. orders from the top are not being executed by subordinates.” Which is why today, “the Russian military is divided into two categories: Those who fought in Ukraine and those who did not.”
Rather, the question is, will “those who fought in Ukraine shoot at Prigozhin’s men? It would seem many do not want to as they fought shoulder-to-shoulder together” and that is why “those who did not fight in Ukraine are irrelevant.”
In the case of Wagner specifically, “I think of these criminals: they are seasoned warriors who are ready to die, unlike the Rosgvardia [Russian National Guard] that has never faced such a task. One fighter from Bakhmut worth 50 [untested Russian National Guard] from Omsk.”
There are reports that Putin has left Moscow: Does Putin realize that the situation is out-of-control?
“I think so, clearly: Putin took a night and half a day to respond. He spent hours without being able to find words.”
“Putin was supreme authority – but now we see he is no one. It took him ten hours, even more – just to make his statement. But it seems too little too late,” moreover, “it is unclear if he has resources to fight back.”
What we are seeing in the Kremlin is not shocking to Kasparov as “This is how dictatorship functions: Where you have absolute authority. Like a supreme judge. If Goring is quarrelling with Himmler, then the Fuehrer is the absolute authority. You can’t imagine them fighting and Hitler hiding in his bunker.” And now, “Prigozhin’s Telegram has said that Putin chose the wrong side and soon [Russia] will have a new president.”
Will the Russian democratic opposition support Prigozhin?
“We are not planning to support Prigozhin – he is a criminal…Dictatorship that stays around too long works out poorly. It is the illusion of stability. This is what happened with Khadafi. If you let him turn his country into a political desert…What animals live in a desert? Scorpions, rats, snakes…
So, what’s next?
Kasparov is clear on this: “The fall of Putin is inevitable. He has lost his aura of invincibility and as a supreme leader.”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Transnistria_War
Further: July 12, 2021
Putin’s article in which he builds a case to invade Ukraine 7 months before he does so, even while “negotiating” with Zelensky
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Presidential Executive Office 2023
Events
Source URL: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181
Article by Vladimir Putin “On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians”
July 12, 2021
17:00
During the recent Direct Line, when I was asked about Russian-Ukrainian relations, I said that Russians and Ukrainians were one people – a single whole. These words were not driven by some short-term considerations or prompted by the current political context. It is what I have said on numerous occasions and what I firmly believe. I therefore feel it necessary to explain my position in detail and share my assessments of today’s situation.
First of all, I would like to emphasize that the wall that has emerged in recent years between Russia and Ukraine, between the parts of what is essentially the same historical and spiritual space, to my mind is our great common misfortune and tragedy. These are, first and foremost, the consequences of our own mistakes made at different periods of time. But these are also the result of deliberate efforts by those forces that have always sought to undermine our unity. The formula they apply has been known from time immemorial – divide and rule. There is nothing new here. Hence the attempts to play on the ”national question“ and sow discord among people, the overarching goal being to divide and then to pit the parts of a single people against one another.
To have a better understanding of the present and look into the future, we need to turn to history. Certainly, it is impossible to cover in this article all the developments that have taken place over more than a thousand years. But I will focus on the key, pivotal moments that are important for us to remember, both in Russia and Ukraine.
Russians, Ukrainians, and Belarusians are all descendants of Ancient Rus, which was the largest state in Europe. Slavic and other tribes across the vast territory – from Ladoga, Novgorod, and Pskov to Kiev and Chernigov – were bound together by one language (which we now refer to as Old Russian), economic ties, the rule of the princes of the Rurik dynasty, and – after the baptism of Rus – the Orthodox faith. The spiritual choice made by St. Vladimir, who was both Prince of Novgorod and Grand Prince of Kiev, still largely determines our affinity today.
The throne of Kiev held a dominant position in Ancient Rus. This had been the custom since the late 9th century. The Tale of Bygone Years captured for posterity the words of Oleg the Prophet about Kiev, ”Let it be the mother of all Russian cities.“
Later, like other European states of that time, Ancient Rus faced a decline of central rule and fragmentation. At the same time, both the nobility and the common people perceived Rus as a common territory, as their homeland.
The fragmentation intensified after Batu Khan’s devastating invasion, which ravaged many cities, including Kiev. The northeastern part of Rus fell under the control of the Golden Horde but retained limited sovereignty. The southern and western Russian lands largely became part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, which – most significantly – was referred to in historical records as the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Russia.
Members of the princely and “boyar” clans would change service from one prince to another, feuding with each other but also making friendships and alliances. Voivode Bobrok of Volyn and the sons of Grand Duke of Lithuania Algirdas – Andrey of Polotsk and Dmitry of Bryansk – fought next to Grand Duke Dmitry Ivanovich of Moscow on the Kulikovo field. At the same time, Grand Duke of Lithuania Jogaila – son of the Princess of Tver – led his troops to join with Mamai. These are all pages of our shared history, reflecting its complex and multi-dimensional nature.
Most importantly, people both in the western and eastern Russian lands spoke the same language. Their faith was Orthodox. Up to the middle of the 15th century, the unified church government remained in place.
At a new stage of historical development, both Lithuanian Rus and Moscow Rus could have become the points of attraction and consolidation of the territories of Ancient Rus. It so happened that Moscow became the center of reunification, continuing the tradition of ancient Russian statehood. Moscow princes – the descendants of Prince Alexander Nevsky – cast off the foreign yoke and began gathering the Russian lands.
In the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, other processes were unfolding. In the 14th century, Lithuania’s ruling elite converted to Catholicism. In the 16th century, it signed the Union of Lublin with the Kingdom of Poland to form the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth. The Polish Catholic nobility received considerable land holdings and privileges in the territory of Rus. In accordance with the 1596 Union of Brest, part of the western Russian Orthodox clergy submitted to the authority of the Pope. The process of Polonization and Latinization began, ousting Orthodoxy.
As a consequence, in the 16–17th centuries, the liberation movement of the Orthodox population was gaining strength in the Dnieper region. The events during the times of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky became a turning point. His supporters struggled for autonomy from the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.
In its 1649 appeal to the king of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Zaporizhian Host demanded that the rights of the Russian Orthodox population be respected, that the voivode of Kiev be Russian and of Greek faith, and that the persecution of the churches of God be stopped. But the Cossacks were not heard.
Bohdan Khmelnytsky then made appeals to Moscow, which were considered by the Zemsky Sobor. On 1 October 1653, members of the supreme representative body of the Russian state decided to support their brothers in faith and take them under patronage. In January 1654, the Pereyaslav Council confirmed that decision. Subsequently, the ambassadors of Bohdan Khmelnytsky and Moscow visited dozens of cities, including Kiev, whose populations swore allegiance to the Russian tsar. Incidentally, nothing of the kind happened at the conclusion of the Union of Lublin.
In a letter to Moscow in 1654, Bohdan Khmelnytsky thanked Tsar Aleksey Mikhaylovich for taking ”the whole Zaporizhian Host and the whole Russian Orthodox world under the strong and high hand of the Tsar“. It means that, in their appeals to both the Polish king and the Russian tsar, the Cossacks referred to and defined themselves as Russian Orthodox people.
Over the course of the protracted war between the Russian state and the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, some of the hetmans, successors of Bohdan Khmelnytsky, would ”detach themselves“ from Moscow or seek support from Sweden, Poland, or Turkey. But, again, for the people, that was a war of liberation. It ended with the Truce of Andrusovo in 1667. The final outcome was sealed by the Treaty of Perpetual Peace in 1686. The Russian state incorporated the city of Kiev and the lands on the left bank of the Dnieper River, including Poltava region, Chernigov region, and Zaporozhye. Their inhabitants were reunited with the main part of the Russian Orthodox people. These territories were referred to as ”Malorossia“ (Little Russia).
The name ”Ukraine“ was used more often in the meaning of the Old Russian word ”okraina“ (periphery), which is found in written sources from the 12th century, referring to various border territories. And the word ”Ukrainian“, judging by archival documents, originally referred to frontier guards who protected the external borders.
On the right bank, which remained under the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, the old orders were restored, and social and religious oppression intensified. On the contrary, the lands on the left bank, taken under the protection of the unified state, saw rapid development. People from the other bank of the Dnieper moved here en masse. They sought support from people who spoke the same language and had the same faith.
During the Great Northern War with Sweden, the people in Malorossia were not faced with a choice of whom to side with. Only a small portion of the Cossacks supported Mazepa’s rebellion. People of all orders and degrees considered themselves Russian and Orthodox.
Cossack senior officers belonging to the nobility would reach the heights of political, diplomatic, and military careers in Russia. Graduates of Kiev-Mohyla Academy played a leading role in church life. This was also the case during the Hetmanate – an essentially autonomous state formation with a special internal structure – and later in the Russian Empire. Malorussians in many ways helped build a big common country – its statehood, culture, and science. They participated in the exploration and development of the Urals, Siberia, the Caucasus, and the Far East. Incidentally, during the Soviet period, natives of Ukraine held major, including the highest, posts in the leadership of the unified state. Suffice it to say that Nikita Khrushchev and Leonid Brezhnev, whose party biography was most closely associated with Ukraine, led the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) for almost 30 years.
In the second half of the 18th century, following the wars with the Ottoman Empire, Russia incorporated Crimea and the lands of the Black Sea region, which became known as Novorossiya. They were populated by people from all of the Russian provinces. After the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Russian Empire regained the western Old Russian lands, with the exception of Galicia and Transcarpathia, which became part of the Austrian – and later Austro-Hungarian – Empire.
The incorporation of the western Russian lands into the single state was not merely the result of political and diplomatic decisions. It was underlain by the common faith, shared cultural traditions, and – I would like to emphasize it once again – language similarity. Thus, as early as the beginning of the 17th century, one of the hierarchs of the Uniate Church, Joseph Rutsky, communicated to Rome that people in Moscovia called Russians from the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth their brothers, that their written language was absolutely identical, and differences in the vernacular were insignificant. He drew an analogy with the residents of Rome and Bergamo. These are, as we know, the center and the north of modern Italy.
Many centuries of fragmentation and living within different states naturally brought about regional language peculiarities, resulting in the emergence of dialects. The vernacular enriched the literary language. Ivan Kotlyarevsky, Grigory Skovoroda, and Taras Shevchenko played a huge role here. Their works are our common literary and cultural heritage. Taras Shevchenko wrote poetry in the Ukrainian language, and prose mainly in Russian. The books of Nikolay Gogol, a Russian patriot and native of Poltavshchyna, are written in Russian, bristling with Malorussian folk sayings and motifs. How can this heritage be divided between Russia and Ukraine? And why do it?
The south-western lands of the Russian Empire, Malorussia and Novorossiya, and the Crimea developed as ethnically and religiously diverse entities. Crimean Tatars, Armenians, Greeks, Jews, Karaites, Krymchaks, Bulgarians, Poles, Serbs, Germans, and other peoples lived here. They all preserved their faith, traditions, and customs.
I am not going to idealise anything. We do know there were the Valuev Circular of 1863 an then the Ems Ukaz of 1876, which restricted the publication and importation of religious and socio-political literature in the Ukrainian language. But it is important to be mindful of the historical context. These decisions were taken against the backdrop of dramatic events in Poland and the desire of the leaders of the Polish national movement to exploit the ”Ukrainian issue“ to their own advantage. I should add that works of fiction, books of Ukrainian poetry and folk songs continued to be published. There is objective evidence that the Russian Empire was witnessing an active process of development of the Malorussian cultural identity within the greater Russian nation, which united the Velikorussians, the Malorussians and the Belorussians.
At the same time, the idea of Ukrainian people as a nation separate from the Russians started to form and gain ground among the Polish elite and a part of the Malorussian intelligentsia. Since there was no historical basis – and could not have been any, conclusions were substantiated by all sorts of concoctions, which went as far as to claim that the Ukrainians are the true Slavs and the Russians, the Muscovites, are not. Such ”hypotheses“ became increasingly used for political purposes as a tool of rivalry between European states.
Since the late 19th century, the Austro-Hungarian authorities had latched onto this narrative, using it as a counterbalance to the Polish national movement and pro-Muscovite sentiments in Galicia. During World War I, Vienna played a role in the formation of the so-called Legion of Ukrainian Sich Riflemen. Galicians suspected of sympathies with Orthodox Christianity and Russia were subjected to brutal repression and thrown into the concentration camps of Thalerhof and Terezin.
Further developments had to do with the collapse of European empires, the fierce civil war that broke out across the vast territory of the former Russian Empire, and foreign intervention.
After the February Revolution, in March 1917, the Central Rada was established in Kiev, intended to become the organ of supreme power. In November 1917, in its Third Universal, it declared the creation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (UPR) as part of Russia.
In December 1917, UPR representatives arrived in Brest-Litovsk, where Soviet Russia was negotiating with Germany and its allies. At a meeting on 10 January 1918, the head of the Ukrainian delegation read out a note proclaiming the independence of Ukraine. Subsequently, the Central Rada proclaimed Ukraine independent in its Fourth Universal.
The declared sovereignty did not last long. Just a few weeks later, Rada delegates signed a separate treaty with the German bloc countries. Germany and Austria-Hungary were at the time in a dire situation and needed Ukrainian bread and raw materials. In order to secure large-scale supplies, they obtained consent for sending their troops and technical staff to the UPR. In fact, this was used as a pretext for occupation.
For those who have today given up the full control of Ukraine to external forces, it would be instructive to remember that, back in 1918, such a decision proved fatal for the ruling regime in Kiev. With the direct involvement of the occupying forces, the Central Rada was overthrown and Hetman Pavlo Skoropadskyi was brought to power, proclaiming instead of the UPR the Ukrainian State, which was essentially under German protectorate.
In November 1918 – following the revolutionary events in Germany and Austria-Hungary – Pavlo Skoropadskyi, who had lost the support of German bayonets, took a different course, declaring that ”Ukraine is to take the lead in the formation of an All-Russian Federation“. However, the regime was soon changed again. It was now the time of the so-called Directorate.
In autumn 1918, Ukrainian nationalists proclaimed the West Ukrainian People’s Republic (WUPR) and, in January 1919, announced its unification with the Ukrainian People’s Republic. In July 1919, Ukrainian forces were crushed by Polish troops, and the territory of the former WUPR came under the Polish rule.
In April 1920, Symon Petliura (portrayed as one of the ”heroes“ in today’s Ukraine) concluded secret conventions on behalf of the UPR Directorate, giving up – in exchange for military support – Galicia and Western Volhynia lands to Poland. In May 1920, Petliurites entered Kiev in a convoy of Polish military units. But not for long. As early as November 1920, following a truce between Poland and Soviet Russia, the remnants of Petliura’s forces surrendered to those same Poles.
The example of the UPR shows that different kinds of quasi-state formations that emerged across the former Russian Empire at the time of the Civil War and turbulence were inherently unstable. Nationalists sought to create their own independent states, while leaders of the White movement advocated indivisible Russia. Many of the republics established by the Bolsheviks’ supporters did not see themselves outside Russia either. Nevertheless, Bolshevik Party leaders sometimes basically drove them out of Soviet Russia for various reasons.
Thus, in early 1918, the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic was proclaimed and asked Moscow to incorporate it into Soviet Russia. This was met with a refusal. During a meeting with the republic’s leaders, Vladimir Lenin insisted that they act as part of Soviet Ukraine. On 15 March 1918, the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) directly ordered that delegates be sent to the Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, including from the Donetsk Basin, and that ”one government for all of Ukraine“ be created at the congress. The territories of the Donetsk-Krivoy Rog Soviet Republic later formed most of the regions of south-eastern Ukraine.
Under the 1921 Treaty of Riga, concluded between the Russian SFSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Poland, the western lands of the former Russian Empire were ceded to Poland. In the interwar period, the Polish government pursued an active resettlement policy, seeking to change the ethnic composition of the Eastern Borderlands – the Polish name for what is now Western Ukraine, Western Belarus and parts of Lithuania. The areas were subjected to harsh Polonisation, local culture and traditions suppressed. Later, during World War II, radical groups of Ukrainian nationalists used this as a pretext for terror not only against Polish, but also against Jewish and Russian populations.
In 1922, when the USSR was created, with the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic becoming one of its founders, a rather fierce debate among the Bolshevik leaders resulted in the implementation of Lenin’s plan to form a union state as a federation of equal republics. The right for the republics to freely secede from the Union was included in the text of the Declaration on the Creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and, subsequently, in the 1924 USSR Constitution. By doing so, the authors planted in the foundation of our statehood the most dangerous time bomb, which exploded the moment the safety mechanism provided by the leading role of the CPSU was gone, the party itself collapsing from within. A ”parade of sovereignties“ followed. On 8 December 1991, the so-called Belovezh Agreement on the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States was signed, stating that ”the USSR as a subject of international law and a geopolitical reality no longer existed.“ By the way, Ukraine never signed or ratified the CIS Charter adopted back in 1993.
In the 1920’s-1930’s, the Bolsheviks actively promoted the ”localization policy“, which took the form of Ukrainization in the Ukrainian SSR. Symbolically, as part of this policy and with consent of the Soviet authorities, Mikhail Grushevskiy, former chairman of Central Rada, one of the ideologists of Ukrainian nationalism, who at a certain period of time had been supported by Austria-Hungary, was returned to the USSR and was elected member of the Academy of Sciences.
The localization policy undoubtedly played a major role in the development and consolidation of the Ukrainian culture, language and identity. At the same time, under the guise of combating the so-called Russian great-power chauvinism, Ukrainization was often imposed on those who did not see themselves as Ukrainians. This Soviet national policy secured at the state level the provision on three separate Slavic peoples: Russian, Ukrainian and Belorussian, instead of the large Russian nation, a triune people comprising Velikorussians, Malorussians and Belorussians.
In 1939, the USSR regained the lands earlier seized by Poland. A major portion of these became part of the Soviet Ukraine. In 1940, the Ukrainian SSR incorporated part of Bessarabia, which had been occupied by Romania since 1918, as well as Northern Bukovina. In 1948, Zmeyiniy Island (Snake Island) in the Black Sea became part of Ukraine. In 1954, the Crimean Region of the RSFSR was given to the Ukrainian SSR, in gross violation of legal norms that were in force at the time.
I would like to dwell on the destiny of Carpathian Ruthenia, which became part of Czechoslovakia following the breakup of Austria-Hungary. Rusins made up a considerable share of local population. While this is hardly mentioned any longer, after the liberation of Transcarpathia by Soviet troops the congress of the Orthodox population of the region voted for the inclusion of Carpathian Ruthenia in the RSFSR or, as a separate Carpathian republic, in the USSR proper. Yet the choice of people was ignored. In summer 1945, the historical act of the reunification of Carpathian Ukraine ”with its ancient motherland, Ukraine“ – as The Pravda newspaper put it – was announced.
Therefore, modern Ukraine is entirely the product of the Soviet era. We know and remember well that it was shaped – for a significant part – on the lands of historical Russia. To make sure of that, it is enough to look at the boundaries of the lands reunited with the Russian state in the 17th century and the territory of the Ukrainian SSR when it left the Soviet Union.
The Bolsheviks treated the Russian people as inexhaustible material for their social experiments. They dreamt of a world revolution that would wipe out national states. That is why they were so generous in drawing borders and bestowing territorial gifts. It is no longer important what exactly the idea of the Bolshevik leaders who were chopping the country into pieces was. We can disagree about minor details, background and logics behind certain decisions. One fact is crystal clear: Russia was robbed, indeed.
When working on this article, I relied on open-source documents that contain well-known facts rather than on some secret records. The leaders of modern Ukraine and their external ”patrons“ prefer to overlook these facts. They do not miss a chance, however, both inside the country and abroad, to condemn ”the crimes of the Soviet regime,“ listing among them events with which neither the CPSU, nor the USSR, let alone modern Russia, have anything to do. At the same time, the Bolsheviks’ efforts to detach from Russia its historical territories are not considered a crime. And we know why: if they brought about the weakening of Russia, our ill-wishes are happy with that.
Of course, inside the USSR, borders between republics were never seen as state borders; they were nominal within a single country, which, while featuring all the attributes of a federation, was highly centralized – this, again, was secured by the CPSU’s leading role. But in 1991, all those territories, and, which is more important, people, found themselves abroad overnight, taken away, this time indeed, from their historical motherland.
What can be said to this? Things change: countries and communities are no exception. Of course, some part of a people in the process of its development, influenced by a number of reasons and historical circumstances, can become aware of itself as a separate nation at a certain moment. How should we treat that? There is only one answer: with respect!
You want to establish a state of your own: you are welcome! But what are the terms? I will recall the assessment given by one of the most prominent political figures of new Russia, first mayor of Saint Petersburg Anatoly Sobchak. As a legal expert who believed that every decision must be legitimate, in 1992, he shared the following opinion: the republics that were founders of the Union, having denounced the 1922 Union Treaty, must return to the boundaries they had had before joining the Soviet Union. All other territorial acquisitions are subject to discussion, negotiations, given that the ground has been revoked.
In other words, when you leave, take what you brought with you. This logic is hard to refute. I will just say that the Bolsheviks had embarked on reshaping boundaries even before the Soviet Union, manipulating with territories to their liking, in disregard of people’s views.
The Russian Federation recognized the new geopolitical realities: and not only recognized, but, indeed, did a lot for Ukraine to establish itself as an independent country. Throughout the difficult 1990’s and in the new millennium, we have provided considerable support to Ukraine. Whatever ”political arithmetic“ of its own Kiev may wish to apply, in 1991–2013, Ukraine’s budget savings amounted to more than USD 82 billion, while today, it holds on to the mere USD 1.5 billion of Russian payments for gas transit to Europe. If economic ties between our countries had been retained, Ukraine would enjoy the benefit of tens of billions of dollars.
Ukraine and Russia have developed as a single economic system over decades and centuries. The profound cooperation we had 30 years ago is an example for the European Union to look up to. We are natural complementary economic partners. Such a close relationship can strengthen competitive advantages, increasing the potential of both countries.
Ukraine used to possess great potential, which included powerful infrastructure, gas transportation system, advanced shipbuilding, aviation, rocket and instrument engineering industries, as well as world-class scientific, design and engineering schools. Taking over this legacy and declaring independence, Ukrainian leaders promised that the Ukrainian economy would be one of the leading ones and the standard of living would be among the best in Europe.
Today, high-tech industrial giants that were once the pride of Ukraine and the entire Union, are sinking. Engineering output has dropped by 42 per cent over ten years. The scale of deindustrialization and overall economic degradation is visible in Ukraine’s electricity production, which has seen a nearly two-time decrease in 30 years. Finally, according to IMF reports, in 2019, before the coronavirus pandemic broke out, Ukraine’s GDP per capita had been below USD 4 thousand. This is less than in the Republic of Albania, the Republic of Moldova, or unrecognized Kosovo. Nowadays, Ukraine is Europe’s poorest country.
Who is to blame for this? Is it the people of Ukraine’s fault? Certainly not. It was the Ukrainian authorities who waisted and frittered away the achievements of many generations. We know how hardworking and talented the people of Ukraine are. They can achieve success and outstanding results with perseverance and determination. And these qualities, as well as their openness, innate optimism and hospitality have not gone. The feelings of millions of people who treat Russia not just well but with great affection, just as we feel about Ukraine, remain the same.
Until 2014, hundreds of agreements and joint projects were aimed at developing our economies, business and cultural ties, strengthening security, and solving common social and environmental problems. They brought tangible benefits to people – both in Russia and Ukraine. This is what we believed to be most important. And that is why we had a fruitful interaction with all, I emphasize, with all the leaders of Ukraine.
Even after the events in Kiev of 2014, I charged the Russian government to elaborate options for preserving and maintaining our economic ties within relevant ministries and agencies. However, there was and is still no mutual will to do the same. Nevertheless, Russia is still one of Ukraine’s top three trading partners, and hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians are coming to us to work, and they find a welcome reception and support. So that what the ”aggressor state“ is.
When the USSR collapsed, many people in Russia and Ukraine sincerely believed and assumed that our close cultural, spiritual and economic ties would certainly last, as would the commonality of our people, who had always had a sense of unity at their core. However, events – at first gradually, and then more rapidly – started to move in a different direction.
In essence, Ukraine’s ruling circles decided to justify their country’s independence through the denial of its past, however, except for border issues. They began to mythologize and rewrite history, edit out everything that united us, and refer to the period when Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union as an occupation. The common tragedy of collectivization and famine of the early 1930s was portrayed as the genocide of the Ukrainian people.
Radicals and neo-Nazis were open and more and more insolent about their ambitions. They were indulged by both the official authorities and local oligarchs, who robbed the people of Ukraine and kept their stolen money in Western banks, ready to sell their motherland for the sake of preserving their capital. To this should be added the persistent weakness of state institutions and the position of a willing hostage to someone else’s geopolitical will.
I recall that long ago, well before 2014, the U.S. and EU countries systematically and consistently pushed Ukraine to curtail and limit economic cooperation with Russia. We, as the largest trade and economic partner of Ukraine, suggested discussing the emerging problems in the Ukraine-Russia-EU format. But every time we were told that Russia had nothing to do with it and that the issue concerned only the EU and Ukraine. De facto Western countries rejected Russia’s repeated calls for dialogue.
Step by step, Ukraine was dragged into a dangerous geopolitical game aimed at turning Ukraine into a barrier between Europe and Russia, a springboard against Russia. Inevitably, there came a time when the concept of ”Ukraine is not Russia“ was no longer an option. There was a need for the ”anti-Russia“ concept which we will never accept.
The owners of this project took as a basis the old groundwork of the Polish-Austrian ideologists to create an ”anti-Moscow Russia“. And there is no need to deceive anyone that this is being done in the interests of the people of Ukraine. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth never needed Ukrainian culture, much less Cossack autonomy. In Austria-Hungary, historical Russian lands were mercilessly exploited and remained the poorest. The Nazis, abetted by collaborators from the OUN-UPA, did not need Ukraine, but a living space and slaves for Aryan overlords.
Nor were the interests of the Ukrainian people thought of in February 2014. The legitimate public discontent, caused by acute socio-economic problems, mistakes, and inconsistent actions of the authorities of the time, was simply cynically exploited. Western countries directly interfered in Ukraine’s internal affairs and supported the coup. Radical nationalist groups served as its battering ram. Their slogans, ideology, and blatant aggressive Russophobia have to a large extent become defining elements of state policy in Ukraine.
All the things that united us and bring us together so far came under attack. First and foremost, the Russian language. Let me remind you that the new ”Maidan“ authorities first tried to repeal the law on state language policy. Then there was the law on the ”purification of power“, the law on education that virtually cut the Russian language out of the educational process.
Lastly, as early as May of this year, the current president introduced a bill on ”indigenous peoples“ to the Rada. Only those who constitute an ethnic minority and do not have their own state entity outside Ukraine are recognized as indigenous. The law has been passed. New seeds of discord have been sown. And this is happening in a country, as I have already noted, that is very complex in terms of its territorial, national and linguistic composition, and its history of formation.
There may be an argument: if you are talking about a single large nation, a triune nation, then what difference does it make who people consider themselves to be – Russians, Ukrainians, or Belarusians. I completely agree with this. Especially since the determination of nationality, particularly in mixed families, is the right of every individual, free to make his or her own choice.
But the fact is that the situation in Ukraine today is completely different because it involves a forced change of identity. And the most despicable thing is that the Russians in Ukraine are being forced not only to deny their roots, generations of their ancestors but also to believe that Russia is their enemy. It would not be an exaggeration to say that the path of forced assimilation, the formation of an ethnically pure Ukrainian state, aggressive towards Russia, is comparable in its consequences to the use of weapons of mass destruction against us. As a result of such a harsh and artificial division of Russians and Ukrainians, the Russian people in all may decrease by hundreds of thousands or even millions.
Our spiritual unity has also been attacked. As in the days of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a new ecclesiastical has been initiated. The secular authorities, making no secret of their political aims, have blatantly interfered in church life and brought things to a split, to the seizure of churches, the beating of priests and monks. Even extensive autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church while maintaining spiritual unity with the Moscow Patriarchate strongly displeases them. They have to destroy this prominent and centuries-old symbol of our kinship at all costs.
I think it is also natural that the representatives of Ukraine over and over again vote against the UN General Assembly resolution condemning the glorification of Nazism. Marches and torchlit processions in honor of remaining war criminals from the SS units take place under the protection of the official authorities. Mazepa, who betrayed everyone, Petliura, who paid for Polish patronage with Ukrainian lands, and Bandera, who collaborated with the Nazis, are ranked as national heroes. Everything is being done to erase from the memory of young generations the names of genuine patriots and victors, who have always been the pride of Ukraine.
For the Ukrainians who fought in the Red Army, in partisan units, the Great Patriotic War was indeed a patriotic war because they were defending their home, their great common Motherland. Over two thousand soldiers became Heroes of the Soviet Union. Among them are legendary pilot Ivan Kozhedub, fearless sniper, defender of Odessa and Sevastopol Lyudmila Pavlichenko, valiant guerrilla commander Sidor Kovpak. This indomitable generation fought, those people gave their lives for our future, for us. To forget their feat is to betray our grandfathers, mothers and fathers.
The anti-Russia project has been rejected by millions of Ukrainians. The people of Crimea and residents of Sevastopol made their historic choice. And people in the southeast peacefully tried to defend their stance. Yet, all of them, including children, were labeled as separatists and terrorists. They were threatened with ethnic cleansing and the use of military force. And the residents of Donetsk and Lugansk took up arms to defend their home, their language and their lives. Were they left any other choice after the riots that swept through the cities of Ukraine, after the horror and tragedy of 2 May 2014 in Odessa where Ukrainian neo-Nazis burned people alive making a new Khatyn out of it? The same massacre was ready to be carried out by the followers of Bandera in Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk and Lugansk. Even now they do not abandon such plans. They are biding their time. But their time will not come.
The coup d’état and the subsequent actions of the Kiev authorities inevitably provoked confrontation and civil war. The UN High Commissioner for Human Rights estimates that the total number of victims in the conflict in Donbas has exceeded 13,000. Among them are the elderly and children. These are terrible, irreparable losses.
Russia has done everything to stop fratricide. The Minsk agreements aimed at a peaceful settlement of the conflict in Donbas have been concluded. I am convinced that they still have no alternative. In any case, no one has withdrawn their signatures from the Minsk Package of Measures or from the relevant statements by the leaders of the Normandy format countries. No one has initiated a review of the United Nations Security Council resolution of 17 February 2015.
During official negotiations, especially after being reined in by Western partners, Ukraine’s representatives regularly declare their ”full adherence“ to the Minsk agreements, but are in fact guided by a position of ”unacceptability“. They do not intend to seriously discuss either the special status of Donbas or safeguards for the people living there. They prefer to exploit the image of the ”victim of external aggression“ and peddle Russophobia. They arrange bloody provocations in Donbas. In short, they attract the attention of external patrons and masters by all means.
Apparently, and I am becoming more and more convinced of this: Kiev simply does not need Donbas. Why? Because, firstly, the inhabitants of these regions will never accept the order that they have tried and are trying to impose by force, blockade and threats. And secondly, the outcome of both Minsk‑1 and Minsk‑2 which give a real chance to peacefully restore the territorial integrity of Ukraine by coming to an agreement directly with the DPR and LPR with Russia, Germany and France as mediators, contradicts the entire logic of the anti-Russia project. And it can only be sustained by the constant cultivation of the image of an internal and external enemy. And I would add – under the protection and control of the Western powers.
This is what is actually happening. First of all, we are facing the creation of a climate of fear in Ukrainian society, aggressive rhetoric, indulging neo-Nazis and militarising the country. Along with that we are witnessing not just complete dependence but direct external control, including the supervision of the Ukrainian authorities, security services and armed forces by foreign advisers, military ”development“ of the territory of Ukraine and deployment of NATO infrastructure. It is no coincidence that the aforementioned flagrant law on ”indigenous peoples“ was adopted under the cover of large-scale NATO exercises in Ukraine.
This is also a disguise for the takeover of the rest of the Ukrainian economy and the exploitation of its natural resources. The sale of agricultural land is not far off, and it is obvious who will buy it up. From time to time, Ukraine is indeed given financial resources and loans, but under their own conditions and pursuing their own interests, with preferences and benefits for Western companies. By the way, who will pay these debts back? Apparently, it is assumed that this will have to be done not only by today’s generation of Ukrainians but also by their children, grandchildren and probably great-grandchildren.
The Western authors of the anti-Russia project set up the Ukrainian political system in such a way that presidents, members of parliament and ministers would change but the attitude of separation from and enmity with Russia would remain. Reaching peace was the main election slogan of the incumbent president. He came to power with this. The promises turned out to be lies. Nothing has changed. And in some ways the situation in Ukraine and around Donbas has even degenerated.
In the anti-Russia project, there is no place either for a sovereign Ukraine or for the political forces that are trying to defend its real independence. Those who talk about reconciliation in Ukrainian society, about dialogue, about finding a way out of the current impasse are labelled as ”pro-Russian“ agents.
Again, for many people in Ukraine, the anti-Russia project is simply unacceptable. And there are millions of such people. But they are not allowed to raise their heads. They have had their legal opportunity to defend their point of view in fact taken away from them. They are intimidated, driven underground. Not only are they persecuted for their convictions, for the spoken word, for the open expression of their position, but they are also killed. Murderers, as a rule, go unpunished.
Today, the ”right“ patriot of Ukraine is only the one who hates Russia. Moreover, the entire Ukrainian statehood, as we understand it, is proposed to be further built exclusively on this idea. Hate and anger, as world history has repeatedly proved this, are a very shaky foundation for sovereignty, fraught with many serious risks and dire consequences.
All the subterfuges associated with the anti-Russia project are clear to us. And we will never allow our historical territories and people close to us living there to be used against Russia. And to those who will undertake such an attempt, I would like to say that this way they will destroy their own country.
The incumbent authorities in Ukraine like to refer to Western experience, seeing it as a model to follow. Just have a look at how Austria and Germany, the USA and Canada live next to each other. Close in ethnic composition, culture, in fact sharing one language, they remain sovereign states with their own interests, with their own foreign policy. But this does not prevent them from the closest integration or allied relations. They have very conditional, transparent borders. And when crossing them the citizens feel at home. They create families, study, work, do business. Incidentally, so do millions of those born in Ukraine who now live in Russia. We see them as our own close people.
Russia is open to dialogue with Ukraine and ready to discuss the most complex issues. But it is important for us to understand that our partner is defending its national interests but not serving someone else’s, and is not a tool in someone else’s hands to fight against us.
We respect the Ukrainian language and traditions. We respect Ukrainians’ desire to see their country free, safe and prosperous.
I am confident that true sovereignty of Ukraine is possible only in partnership with Russia. Our spiritual, human and civilizational ties formed for centuries and have their origins in the same sources, they have been hardened by common trials, achievements and victories. Our kinship has been transmitted from generation to generation. It is in the hearts and the memory of people living in modern Russia and Ukraine, in the blood ties that unite millions of our families. Together we have always been and will be many times stronger and more successful. For we are one people.
Today, these words may be perceived by some people with hostility. They can be interpreted in many possible ways. Yet, many people will hear me. And I will say one thing – Russia has never been and will never be “anti-Ukraine“. And what Ukraine will be – it is up to its citizens to decide.
Publication status
Published in sections: News, Transcripts
Publication date: July 12, 2021, 17:00
Direct link: en.kremlin.ru/d/66181
Presidential Executive Office
2023
End of Copied Text from Kremlin Web Page (Their English translation)
My Notes as a dot graph to show NATO versus Other “concerns”
Length (headline and text): 6,901 words – 42,899 characters
Length of paragraph with “NATO” statement: 94 words – 635 characters
Distance down the document: starts after 6,047 words – 37,744 characters
94/6,901 = 0.01362 == 1.37%
635/42899 = 0.01480 == 1.5% call it 1.435%
6047/6901 = 0.8762 == starts 87.6% of the way down the page
37744/42899 = 0.8798 == starts 88% of the way down the page
……….……….……….……….……….……….……….……(.).……….
Article starts here – > above, 100 dots — > < —
The larger, red dot at the 88th position represents the paragraph with “NATO” twice in that paragraph. Putin waits until almost the end of his speech to bring up NATO and when he does bring up NATO it is a tiny 1.4% of the whole. The other 98.6% is denying Ukraine’s right to exist as an independent nation or that it has a language. This is a clear indication of Putin’s real stated reasons in July 2021 for his invasion of 7 months later. And, in the language of the paragraph, the 1.4% of the whole, his “concern” is for Ukraine being dominated by Nazis and controlled by NATO. So, he is rescuing “the Ukraine” area. Not once, does he state this as a threat to Russia or of NATO pushing or crowding Russia.
Note: This next part comes from someone I had a retreat with way back in 1980 and was surprised to see that he now lives in Latvia.
The Baltic and Other States Who Moved away from Russia
Jon Shore – Psychotherapist since 1978 Psyops experience Worked in USSR Mon 19 June 2023
( http://www.jbsgroupllc.com/ ) Lives in Riga, Latvia – Speaks English, German, Spanish
Why did the Baltic states want to leave the Soviet Union so much?
I worked in the USSR in the 1980s. I was there and tell you all of this from personal experience.
The Soviet Union was like a vampire sucking the life out of everywhere it was. It was corrupt from top to bottom. It was inefficient. Most of the high level party members were sociopaths. There were KGB and informants everywhere. You never knew who was listening and who would turn you in to the authorities. Most of the buildings were built like shit. Roads were shit. Trains were shit. Only the metro systems in large cities were nice. Technology was substandard. Cars were shit if you could even get one after years of being on a list. Almost everything made in the USSR was crap. Traveling outside the USSR was difficult. Food products and most other products were difficult to get quite often.
Everything was depressing. Depressing architecture. Depressing colors. Depressing movies. Depressing salaries. Depressing lifestyles. Depressing poor quality foods.
Only high-level party members and celebrities lived well.
I could go on and on and on.
It was not only the Baltic States where life was like this. Actually, life in most of the Soviet states was better than in Russia.
Everything that the USSR touched turned to shit. Now it is the same with Russia. Most former Soviet states are still struggling to repair the physical and psychological damage done by the USSR.
I hope that answers your question.
This is included because of the handy map showing the European states who just wanted to get away from Russia and took the opportunity when they could, especially because the Soviet Union had invaded them before, not just during WWII but later when several had independence movements.
Vojta Rod – Studied Media Studies at Metropolitan University Prague (Graduated 2018) (from Quora)
Why are Czechs so afraid of Russians?
We are not afraid of them, we just openly say that they are dangerous, aggressive and backward. Unlike many other Western countries, we unfortunately had a direct experience with the Soviets/Russians.
Czechia is located in the middle of Central Europe, integral member (except other organisations) of the EU and NATO for decades. Surounded by allies from all sides. So there isn’t any worry from any direct hit. Something different are Russian info-war and terrorism.
One of the fundamental mistakes many people make when think about Russia and Russians is that we assume they think like most European societies. This is simply nonsense and has never been the case.
Russia is a totalitarian state not only politically but also socially. And with all due respect to the minority of those “normal-minded” Russians, it’s really not just “Putin and the poor Russians under him”, but Putin is the image of Russian society…
And this elementary misunderstanding of the whole state and society was not only held by politicians, but also by millions of Europeans. I personally thought that the society had moved on in the last three decades, not that it is still the same scared and aggressive society, which is completely unaware that the outside world is different and that the way they live and the society they live in is really not normal – at least in most European/developed countries.
The fact that they have a criminal’s corpse on display in the main square tells you a lot about a society.
I have found the Elena Gold articles to be well founded and reasoned. So, here is her direct answer. She is a Russian who moved to Australia some years ago and operates model (dating) agency.
– Elena Gold Writing a book about Russo-Ukrainian war.
If it were proven beyond a doubt that the US government aided and abetted Ukraine’s 2014 coup d’etat, would you feel differently about the US keeping Ukraine afloat by funding their government and military operations?
Aaah, the old Vlad Putin’s story – both Vlad Putin and his stories are old – about “2014 coup in Ukraine”.
As if this somehow justifies Russia destroying thriving Ukrainian cities into ruins, Russian soldiers raping Ukrainian kids in front of their mothers — after they have killed fathers of these kids and raped the mothers, Putin ordering to abduct thousands of Ukrainian kids – after killing their parents.
No. Even if it were a “coup”, it would make no difference – Putin would be still an international war criminal and a mass murderer, Russia would still be a terrorist state, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and attempts to annex its territory would still be illegal, and 1991 borders of Ukraine are still the only ones that are legitimate and internationally recognized.
Ukraine held 2 elections since 2014, and in the last election the opposition won — and the ruling party peacefully handed in the reins.
In the meantime, Russia had no change of leadership since 2000 when Vladimir Putin became the president.
And you know, this is what can be said about Russia:
- It started with a coup in 1917, when a German spy Lenin was illegally taken across the border of Russia by German diplomats, who wanted Russia to withdraw from the war. Thus, we can say that the USSR was created by Germany.
- There was another coup in 1991 and then in 1993. In 1993, Russians were shooting into people by tanks and even shot at their own parliament in Moscow.
- Everything that Russia has, they got from the USSR. People from all 15 republics contributed to that, as well as German POWs.
- Russians build monuments and put on pedestal Stalin, who killed millions of people in Holodomor and purges. They also still erect monuments to Lenin, who was self-professed terrorist and led to deaths of millions of people in “Red terror”. Lenin’s body is kept in a Mausoleum on the Red Square in Moscow – not buried for nearly 100 years!
- Russians again are using the USSR red “bloody” flag with hammer and sickle. That’s the symbolic linked to Stalin’s purges and invasion of Afghanistan, suppression of Prague and Czech uprisings, 50-year occupation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia.
- Russia was constantly saved by Americans. Lend-Lease in WWII is just one of many known facts how Americans were saving Russians and Russia.
- Boris Yeltsin decided to go for capitalist Russia after a visit to America. And it was Yeltsin who appointed Putin as a successor. So, it’s Americans fault that Putin came to power in Russia – if they didn’t impress Yeltsin with their wealth, he wouldn’t destroy communism in Russia.
You see how easy it is to start blaming circumstances?
Some of this is copied above in the negotiations section.
Neil Hawker – Retired and living in Ukraine:
Invasion of Ukraine – Putin began planning early as February 2021
Putin hated Ukraine. How did the Russian president come up with the idea of war in Ukraine – personal resentment and a desire for revenge.
3 months before, the Kremlin had already discussed how Ukraine will be divided among large corporations.
Main points:
- Russian officials made a bet on Yanukovych: “That was our son of a bitch. There was a president in the country who was actually on our payroll“. Moscow, with his help, had a plan to get closer to Ukraine, as with Belarus, and dissuade Europe from “flirting“.
- In January 2014, Putin was not yet planning to seize Crimea. It was a spontaneous decision, after the protesters in Kyiv began to defeat the power of Yanukovych, and the idea of dividing Ukraine with a centre in Kharkiv didn’t work (due to the refusal of the city authorities and its residents). The decision was made on the night of Yanukovych’s flight out.
- The separation of Donbas from Ukraine was not Putin’s personal initiative – “They were FSB agents”.
- Putin personally took part in writing the “Minsk” agreements. “If ‘Minsk’ had been completed, then Donbas would have been used to rebuild the whole of Ukraine along its lines. That was the plan”.
- Zelenskyy, after becoming president, tried to settle the war and “negotiate like a human being“, but Putin wanted to impose “Minsk“, which would be a great victory for the Russian Federation.
- At the meeting in 2019, Putin counted on the “capitulation of Ukraine” and the unpreparedness of the Zelenskyy team. However, the President of Ukraine, during Putin’s speech “on special status“, almost laughed and covered his mouth with his hand.
- The “last straw” for Putin was the closure of ‘godfather’ Medvedchuk’s TV channels, which conducted pro-Russian activities in Ukraine. The decision to prepare for full scale war was made in late February-early March 2021, a year before the war.
- Shoigu supported Putin on the full-scale invasion, simply because he didn’t understand the state of the Russian army. The rest of the ‘elite’ found out about the “special operation” the day it began.
https://www.amazon.com/dp/B09X61CYYF/ – Kindle Link
https://www.amazon.com/Fight-Our-Lives-Zelenskyy-Democracy/dp/1668012715 – Hardcover
The Fight of Our Lives: My Time with Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s Battle for Democracy, and What It Means for the World
by Iuliia Mendel
At the trial of God, we will ask: why did you allow all this?
And the answer will be an echo: why did you allow all this?
ILYA KAMINSKY, DEAF REPUBLIC
Mendel, Iuliia. The Fight of Our Lives: My Time with Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s Battle for Democracy, and What It Means for the World (p. V). Atria/One Signal Publishers. Kindle Edition.
The first groups of negotiators from Ukraine and Russia met in Belarus and then in Turkey. Moscow initially demanded the complete capitulation of Ukraine, an early indication of Putin’s lack of serious interest in ending the war. The Russians wanted Ukraine to disarm, acknowledge Russian sovereignty over Crimea, and surrender the entire territory of Donbas. They also wanted the Ukrainian government to abdicate in favor of a Russian-controlled puppet government. And finally, they called for Ukraine to “denazify.” This was absurd: Zelenskyy’s government included a number of Jewish politicians, and he himself had Jewish roots and Jewish family members who died at the hands of real Nazis. The demands were so extreme, no representative of the government could ever agree to them, and while plain acceptance was never on the table, Putin refused to meet Zelenskyy face-to-face to even discuss compromises.
Mendel, Iuliia. The Fight of Our Lives: My Time with Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s Battle for Democracy, and What It Means for the World (p. 124). Atria/One Signal Publishers. Kindle Edition.
By inventing the myth of Nazi groups in Ukraine, Putin was trying to justify a military invasion of the country. For years, his propaganda fed people lies about Ukrainian Nazis raping, robbing, and murdering people in Donbas and about the threat they posed to Crimea. The propaganda spread stories about the drugs these supposed Nazis relied on in combat, about secret biolabs financed by the NATO countries and specifically by the United States to create dangerous viruses, and even about birds trained by Ukrainians to spread these viruses over Russia. Russian media made up countless absurd stories to prove to ordinary Russians who could not easily access information about Ukraine’s democratically elected government that Nazis were in fact in control in that country. This was, of course, an implausible fiction. Ukraine had democratically elected a Russian-speaking president who had Jewish roots and Jewish family members who died at the hands of real Nazis. There was nothing even close to Nazism among the Ukrainian authorities. Yet Russian negotiators even absurdly demanded “denazification” of Ukraine during the peace talks, in perfect agreement with the bots and trolls. They, too, it seemed, had come to believe their own lies.
Mendel, Iuliia. The Fight of Our Lives: My Time with Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s Battle for Democracy, and What It Means for the World (p. 191). Atria/One Signal Publishers. Kindle Edition.
Suddenly no one remembered that in 1994 we had given up our nuclear arsenal—the third largest in the world—in exchange for security guarantees from the United States, the U.K., and Russia, which included the promise to respect our territorial integrity. Each country had signed the Budapest Memorandum agreement, which our government thought would protect us. But when Russia invaded Crimea and Donbas, there was collective amnesia. Overnight, our territorial integrity was in shreds, and so were the security guarantees.
Mendel, Iuliia. The Fight of Our Lives: My Time with Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s Battle for Democracy, and What It Means for the World (pp. 198-199). Atria/One Signal Publishers. Kindle Edition.
Suddenly no one remembered that in 1994 we had given up our nuclear arsenal—the third largest in the world—in exchange for security guarantees from the United States, the U.K., and Russia, which included the promise to respect our territorial integrity. Each country had signed the Budapest Memorandum agreement, which our government thought would protect us. But when Russia invaded Crimea and Donbas, there was collective amnesia. Overnight, our territorial integrity was in shreds, and so were the security guarantees.
Mendel, Iuliia. The Fight of Our Lives: My Time with Zelenskyy, Ukraine’s Battle for Democracy, and What It Means for the World (pp. 198-199). Atria/One Signal Publishers. Kindle Edition.